CHRONOLOGY OF CURATIVE PETITIONS ALLOWED
A.R. ANTULAY V. R.S. NAYAK
The case of A.R. Antulay v R.S. Nayak [1] arose because an earlier Hon’ble Court direction transferring A.R. Antulay’s trial from the Special Judge to the High Court, lacked statutory authority, depriving him of essential legal and procedural rights, including the correct appellate procedure. The order violated natural justice and caused grave prejudice to the accused. Antulay, therefore, approached the Supreme Court under Article 32, claiming violations of his fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 21. Recognising that no judicial error can override statutory provisions, the Supreme Court exercised its inherent powers to recall its earlier direction, declared the previous orders as nullities, and restored the statutory trial
procedure. This reinstated the legal rights and remedies improperly denied by the earlier order.
RUPA ASHOK HURRA V. ASHOK HURRA
In the landmark case of Rupa Hurra v Ashok Hurra[2], the Supreme Court established strict guidelines for entertaining curative petitions to prevent gross miscarriages of justice. The Court held that a curative petition is permissible only after the dismissal of a review petition, ensuring it is not misused as an alternative to review. The petitioner must affirm that the grounds now raised were previously argued in the review and that the
review was dismissed. A curative petition is entertained only in exceptional circumstances, such as a gross failure of natural justice where a party was denied a hearing or where a judge who should have recused did not. The Court underscored that curative jurisdiction is a narrow and exceptional remedy. To prevent misuse, a curative petition must be certified by a Senior Advocate and is initially circulated among the judges who delivered the impugned judgment.
If the matter is found meritorious, it is placed before a bench of the three senior-most judges and the original judges for reconsideration. Hearings are typically by circulation, with open-court hearings reserved for the rarest cases. Established injustice empowers the Supreme Court to use inherent powers, including Article 142, to “do complete justice.” Frivolous petitions are discouraged by the imposition of exemplary costs.
NAVNEET KAUR V. STATE (NCT OF DELHI)
In the case of Navneet Kaur v State (NCT of Dehi)[3], the petitioner filed a curative petition under Article 32, arguing that supervening circumstances demonstrated grave injustice following the dismissal of the review petition. The Supreme Court found that an unexplained eight-year delay in deciding the mercy petition was grounds for commuting the death sentence to life imprisonment. The Court also considered medical evidence of severe mental illness as a further supervening circumstance justifying intervention. The Court concluded that these combined factors
warranted setting aside the earlier dismissal and commuting the death penalty.
DMRC V. DAMEPL
In the case of DMRC v DAMEPL[4], the Hon’ble Court invoked its curative jurisdiction under Article 142, allowing the curative petition upon finding a patent and fundamental error in an earlier judgment that restored an arbitral award. The previous bench had overlooked crucial contractual terms and misapplied legal principles, resulting in a miscarriage of justice. Recognising the significance of the error, the Court corrected the judgment to restore the legally sound outcome, reiterating that curative relief should not be a routine extension of appeal or review, but reserved for extraordinary cases.
CURATIVE PETITIONS NOT ALLOWED
MUKESH V. STATE (NCT OF DELHI)
In the case of Mukesh v State (NCT of Delhi)[5] the Supreme Court rejected the convicts curative petitions in this high-profile case, holding that none of the limited grounds from Rupa Ashok Hurra were fulfilled. The petitioners failed to demonstrate any violation of natural justice, denial of hearing, new supervening circumstances, or procedural irregularity. The Court reiterated that curative petitions cannot be used to re-argue cases or reopen conclusions already confirmed on appeal and review, thus reaffirming that curative petitions are a narrow remedy reserved for exceptional
injustice.
COMMON CAUSE V. UNION OF INDIA
In the matter of Common Cause v Union of India[6], the petitioner challenged the appointment of Rakesh Asthana as Special Director, CBI. After the writ and review petitions were both dismissed, a curative petition was filed. The Supreme Court held that none of the requirements for curative intervention such as violation of natural justice or gross miscarriage of justice were met, and the petition was dismissed.
M. SIDDIQ (D) THROUGH LRS V. MAHANT SURESH DAS & ORS (AYODHYA CASE)
In the case of M. Siddiq Through LRs v. Mahant Suresh Das & Ors [7]The Court stressed that Article 142, even though curative in nature, does not allow the Court to disregard or override the substantive rights of litigants or ignore statutory provisions. Article 142 cannot be used as a means to bypass legislation or supplant statutory rights under the guise of “complete justice.”
UNION OF INDIA V. UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION (BHOPAL GAS TRAGEDY)
Curative petitions in the case of Union of India v Union Carbide Corporation[8] sought reconsideration of a final judgment approving a settlement between the Union of India and Union Carbide Corporation, with arguments that the settlement amount was inadequate. The Supreme Court held that the grounds raised did not meet the narrow criteria established in Rupa Ashok Hurra: there was no violation of natural justice, no denial of opportunity to be heard, and no evidence of bias. The petitions essentially sought to reassess the merits of the settlement, and since no case was made for curative jurisdiction, the petitions were dismissed, leaving the settlement and prior judgments intact.
LATEST CURATIVE PETITION
MINERAL AREA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY V. STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA (SAIL)
In the case of MADA v SAIL [9] a curative petition was filed after the review petition was dismissed twice. The Union Government has filed a curative petition in the Supreme Court against the 9-judge bench judgment which upheld the power of the States to levy tax on mining rights and mineral bearing lands. The dispute concerned whether royalty constitutes a tax, with the Supreme Court holding that royalty is not a tax and directing the Union to return royalty to the state within a set timeframe. The Union of India pursued a curative petition, with the principles discussed in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra guiding the proceedings.
CONCLUSION
The recent trends in the Supreme Court’s approach to curative petitions highlight both the value and the challenges of this extraordinary jurisdiction. While curative petitions remain a vital safeguard against grave injustice and fundamental errors, the Court has consistently held that their scope must remain narrow and exceptional. The strict procedural and substantive requirements laid out in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra continue to guide the Court, ensuring that the remedy is available only in the rarest of rare cases where there is a clear miscarriage of justice or violation of natural justice. The evolving jurisprudence underscores the importance of maintaining judicial consistency, upholding the finality of judgments, and preventing the misuse of curative petitions as an alternative to routine appeals or reviews.
[1] A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602.
[2] Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra, (2002) 4 SCC 388.
[3] Navneet Kaur v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2014) 7 SCC 264.
[4] DMRC Ltd. v. Delhi Airport Metro Express (P) Ltd., (2024) 6 SCC 357.
[5] Mukesh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2017) 6 SCC 1.
[6] Common Cause v. Union of India, (2018) 5 SCC 1.
[7] M. Siddiq (Ram Janmabhumi Temple-5 J.) v. Suresh Das, (2020) 1 SCC 1.
[8] Union of India v. Union Carbide Corpn., (2024) 10 SCC 795
[9] Mineral Area Development Authority v. SAIL, (2024) 10 SCC 1
